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PRIORITIES: II*

Edgar N. Durfee
BoNA FIDE PURCHASE,

cont'd.

Bona Fide Purchase of Money. The equity rule, with its discrimination between legal and equitable interests, occupies such a
conspicuous place on the stage that a student is in some danger of
acquiring the notion that this is the whole measure of bona fide
purchase. There is even reason to think that experienced laivyers
and judges have sometimes too readily assumed that a purchaser
who can't make good on the equity rule must fail. But there are
other rules of bona fide purchase which make nothing of the
distinction between legal and equitable interests. The outstanding
case is that of money. Here a purchaser (including, in this case,
the transferee for antecedent value) in good faith (and here constructive notice is a low hurdle) from any possessor gets good
title. It matters not whether the transferor has legal title subject
only to a trust or an equitable lien, or is a thief having only that
possessory title which is said to be good against all persons except
the true owner.
Bona Fide Purchase of Negotiable Paper. Here the distinction
between legal and equitable interests is as irrelevant as in the
case of money. There are, however, several points in which the
purchaser of negotiable paper is in a weaker position than the
purchaser of money. (1) There is in this case more room for the
doctrine of constructive notice, sub nom. "bad faith." The difference, however, is on the fact side,-a negotiable instrument
carries part of its personal history on its face. (2) The transferor
must have a good "paper title" in this sense, that the instrument must be payable to bearer or to the order of the transferor,
either by virtue of its original form or by virtue of genuine, not
forged, endorsement. In other words, one can not be a holder in
due course if he traces title through a forged endorsement. Might
estoppel help him out if he could show negligence on the part of
the person whose endorsement was forged? (3) It may be essential

• This is the second part of "Priorities" (also known as "Little Nemo") which was
taken from Professor Durfee's teaching materials. The first part was published in the
February issue-which was dedicated to the memory of Professor Durfee.-Ed.
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that the paper be taken before maturity, but the question is
debatable both on authority and on principle. (4) Until N.I.L.
there -iyas a distinction in the definition of value.
Side-Show: Defenses to Negotiable Paper. These remarks about
bona fide purchase of negotiable paper have to do with the
priority problem,-the question what title the purchaser gets
where his transferor has something less than the title he purports
to transfer. That is all that logically belongs under the heading
"Priorities." But it will be convenient to go one step afield to consider the effect of bona fide purchase upon the obligations of the
parties whose names appear upon the paper as makers, drawers,
acceptors or endorsers. The common statement is that bona fide
purchase cuts off personal defenses, but not real defenses, or the
distinction may be put in terms of equitable defenses and legal
defenses. The real defenses are such as are thought of as going
to the basic requirements of contract obligation, viz. (1) capacity
to contract (e.g. infancy is a real defense); (2) a genuine promise,
whether expressed as in the case of the maker of a note, or implied
as in the case of blank endorsement (e.g. forgery, and alteration
which is a sort of forgery, are real defenses); and intent to promise
(e.g. that extraordinary type of fraud, sometimes called fraud
in esse contractus and sometimes called fraud in factum, is a real
defense, herein admitting to the law some measure of the subjective theory of contract). The personal defenses are such as are
thought of as going merely to the justice of enforcing the promise,
the notable examples being, (1) fraud, mistake and duress of the
common sorts, which merely go to the inducement of the promise;
(2) failure of consideration, meaning, ordinarily, breach of contract by promisee; and (3) payment.
Purchase of negotiable paper after maturity will not cut off
any defenses, however perfect the good faith and the value. It
is sometimes said that the paper ceases to be negotiable at maturity, but this is dubious doctrine because, as previously indicated, there is authority for the position that a bona fide purchaser after maturity gets good title to the instrument. There
seems to be no good reason why the purchaser should not get as
good title as if the paper had been immature, though a fair reason
for holding that he takes subject to all defenses, viz. that nonpayment at maturity suggests that there may have been a good
reason for nonpayment-in other words puts the purchaser on inquiry concerning defenses.
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What do you think about the justice and policy of the law
merchant? Here the judges have talked a great deal about policy,
but seldom to voice any idea except that of facilitating the circulation of commercial paper, enabling it to function as money.
Query how far it is possible, under present conditions, for the
paper of merchants to function as money? And how far is that
desirable? And do you not see other reasons for protection of purchasers of commercial paper?
Bona Fide Purchase of Non-Negotiable Obligations. This
heading covers much ground. It includes tort obligations, which
are not only non-negotiable but are, sometimes at least, non-assignable. It also includes obligations under bilaterally executory
contract, which introduce difficulties with respect to assignability,
and some others. Let us simplify by confining our discussion to
purchase of non-negotiable debts, with the understanding that
the same principles are applicable to other non-negotiable obligations, at least to the extent that in no other case can the bona fide
purchaser occupy a more favorable position than in the case of the
debt.
It will be convenient to consider first the position of the purchaser with respect to defenses of the obligor, meaning, of course,
the supposed obligor. It is a familiar formula that the assignee
stands in the shoes of his assignor, and all the mud on the shoes
goes with them. Defenses available against the assignor are available against the assignee. Of course, an assignee can make out an
estoppel in some cases,-e.g. where he has made inquiry of the
obligor before purchasing. Could he estop the obligor merely on
the fact that the latter has put into the hands of the assignor an
instrument which evidences an obligation?
No distinction is drawn between real and personal defenses, but
we do distinguish between defenses arising before and defenses
arising after the obligor receives notice of the assignment. There
are not many defenses that can arise after the initial transaction,
but one thinks of payment, accord and satisfaction, and set-off.
How about failure of consideration, meaning nonperformance
of counter-promise? Would it make any difference when that happened? Must we not think about two factors: (1) the date when
the defense arises, with reference to notice of the assignment, and
(2) the obligor's freedom of action? Don't we have here a relative
of the last clear chance rule?
Turning from the problem of defenses (the assignee's position
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as against the obligor) to the problem of priority (the assignee's
position as against adverse claimants of the chose) we again meet
the formula that the assignee stands in the assignor's shoes. Here
the equity rule of bona fide purchase is wholly inapplicable,-for
example, in the case of assignment by a trustee of a chose in action. This can be given a neat historical explanation. The rights
of assignees were first worked out in chancery. At that stage, the
assignee could not get legal ownership of the chose and therefore,
under the equity rule of bona fide purchase, could not prevail over
the prior equity. Though the law now recognizes the assignee as
owner (except, in some states, for the formal requirement of suit
in the name of the assignor) the old-shoes rule has survived. Query
whether there are policy factors (in other words, whether there is
anything more than historical accident) in the discrimination between goods and debts?
Little Nemo has almost complete sway in the debt cases, but
is not quite absolute monarch. Chancellor Kent fathered the doctrine that, although an assignee takes subject to "equities" of the
obligor, he does not take subject to "latent equities" of third
persons, if he gives value without notice.26 What was the big idea?
Why "latent"? Kent's doctrine was afterward repudiated in New
York, but it has been accepted in several states. Query what cases
it applies to, other than that of prior trust, which was the case
before the great chancellor? Suppose the purchaser's assignor is
himself an assignee, and has practiced fraud on his assignor? And,
particularly, does Kent's rule apply to that very interesting case
of successive assignments of the same chose by the same assignor
to two (or more) assignees? The editor has never seen it so applied.
But, for that case, there is another qualifying rule, accepted in
England and some of our states, preferring the later assignee if
he is the first to give notice to the obligor.27 But, again, query
just what may be the limits of this rule?
There are some other rules which may help out the bona fide
purchaser under certain circumstances; e.g. when the chose is
embodied in a tangible instrument which the assignor delivers
to him; e.g. when he has collected the obligation, or has got
judgment on it. Should these exceptional rulings (preferring the

26 Murray v. Lylbum, 2 Johns. Ch.
27 Dearle v. Hall, 3 Russ. I and 48,

(N.Y.) 441 (1817).
38 Eng. Rep. 475 and 486 (1828).
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assignee over prior claimants) be regarded as products of analogical reasoning from the equity rule as to purchase of the legal estate'!
Or should we look for origins in that large loose principle of estoppel? Of course, there may be place for estoppel in this field: for
example, if the purchaser before making the purchase inquired of
the adverse claimant, etc. How far will the principle carry? Can
we say that the cestui is estopped because he allowed his trustee
to be clothed with apparent title? And how about the defrauded
assignor of the assignor?
Bona Fide Purchase of Corporate Stock. Corporate stock is
often spoken of as a chose in action, but it is in many respects
unique. It cannot, in this brief sketch of priorities, be dealt with
further than to say that the certificate of stock has been given
quasi-negotiability. Notably, bona fide purchase may cut off prior
legal interests. Statutes have a place in this picture.
Bona Fide Purchase of Chattels: Cases Beyond the Equity
Rule. Returning to chattels, how far can we get beyond the
equity rule? The primary question will concern those limits of the
equity rule which are stated in terms of legal and equitable
interests.
A. Vendor Has a Voidable Title. A purchaser who practices
fraud of the ordinary sort (e.g. misrepresenting his credit, or giving the seller a rubber check) gets but a voidable title, yet his bona
fide subpurchaser gets good title. It is sometimes thought to be a
sufficient reconciliation of such cases with the primary canon of
priority to merely point to the fact that the first purchaser had
a title, though voidable. But a good faith purchaser from one who
has voidable title is not always protected. An infant's sale is merely
voidable, not void, yet under the common law (but see Uniform
Sales Act, section 24), the infant can rescind as against the good
faith subpurchaser. Williston says that the right to rescind for
fraud is "essentially equitable," while the infant's right to rescind
is given by "law as distinguished from equity."28 This is obviously
an attempt to fit the cases to the equity rule of bona fide purchase. It goes smoothly enough so far as concerns the infant, for
his right is clearly of ancient common law origin, but the going

28 WILLISTON, SALES §348. [The references to Williston on Sale.s evidently are to the
second edition (1924), but the section numbers pertinent to this article are the same
in the current edition.-Ed.]
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is not so good on the other side, as Williston himself apparently
realized since he used the guarded expression, "essentially equitable." In fact, rescission by the defrauded vendor of chattels (in
contrast to the parallel case of land) is worked out at law in trover
and replevin, and relief will not be given in equity unless there
are peculiar difficulties in the legal remedies.29 And the oldest
cases which the editor has seen do not suggest an equitable derivation of the protection of the bona fide purchaser. Parker v.
Patrick 30 seems to assume that every bona fide purchaser of goods
is to be protected except where the ancient larceny statute31 gives
the owner the right of restitution upon conviction of the thief.
The assumption does not, of course, hold much common law
water. Mowrey v. Walsh 32 distinguished the fraud case from theft
and bailment cases in that, in the former case, by the "voluntary
delivery" of the defrauded vendor to the fraudulent vendee, "the
property was changed," though the transaction was voidable as
against the wrongdoer. This looks like an assumption that a good
faith purchaser from one who has voidable title is to be protected,
but we have seen that the infancy case will not rhyme with that
proposition.
Perhaps these cases, and some others not heretofore considered,
can be reduced to a coherent analytical scheme. A bona fide purchaser gets good title as against a prior legal claim if his transferor,
or a more remote party in his chain of title, obtained a transfer
from the prior claimant involving certain juristic elements, viz.:
capacity to make an absolute transfer and intent to make an
absolute transfer. The requirement of capacity is not satisfied by
infant or lunatic, who can not transfer more than a voidable title.
The requirement of intent is not satisfied by theft nor by bailment. And there has been much judicial thinking along these
lines. Duress, fraud and mistake, in their ordinary forms, do not
preclude intent to make a transfer but merely create a false motive
for that intent. Therefore a transfer so induced gives a title such
that a bona fide purchaser from the transferee is protected. But
it is otherwise with duress, fraud or mistake in those extraordin-

Id., §567.
5 T. R. 175, 101 Eng. Rep. 99 (1793).
31 21 Hen. 8, c. 11 (1529).
32 8 Cow. (N.Y.) 238 (1828).
29

30
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ary forms which are thought of as precluding intent to make a
transfer, or at least precluding intent to make a transfer to the
person through whom the bona fide purchaser claims. Do you
remember Cundy v. Lindsay,33 where Blenkarn, the rascal who
got the goods, was mistaken for the respectable Blenkiron, and
Rodliff v. Dallinger,34 where the villain who got the goods was
supposed to represent an undisclosed principal? In both cases the
defrauded seller recovered from the bona fide subpurchaser on
the theory that he had never intended to transfer title to the crook.
In the latter case, Holmes, J., distinguished the situation where a
vendee "being identified by the senses and dealt with as the person
so identified, says that he is A, when in fact he is B"; there, he
said, the fraud "goes to the motive for making the contract, not
to its existence."35 If you attempt to harmonize these decisions,
still more if you should have occasion to apply this common law
subtlety to the facts of a case out of court (that is, before you have
a judicial finding of the particular variety of intent entertained
by the seller, which will usually mean a jury finding under instructions elucidating the refinements of the law) you will probably
be ready to exchange your common law birth right for any
rule that would be workable. And, if you think about this problem
critically, you may feel that we have at this point come perilously
close to the discredited subjective theory of contract.
Does the common law have the virtue of consistency? Judge
Holmes' distinction between the "formal constituents of a legal
transaction" and the "motives" inducing a transaction, is substantially the distinction which we found in the classification of
real and personal defenses of the parties to commercial paper.
But note that the analogy to the law merchant is not as perfect
as you might wish; it is good so far as concerns defenses to actions
on the contract obligations of the parties, but not so good with
respect to the more nearly analogous problem of priority of title
to the paper, for the endorsement of infant or lunatic gives good
title to the holder in due course.36
Our discussion has been put in terms of purchase and sub-

33 3 App. Cas. 459 (1878).
34141 Mass. 1, 4 N.E. 805 (1886).
35 For other cases, in plenty, see WILLISTON, SALF.S §635.
,
36 See BRANNAN, NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW, 5th ed., 277 et seq., 559 et seq. (1932).
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purchase, or sale and resale, but the rules of law are, of course,
broader than that. They apply as well to sale followed by pledge
or mortgage to B.F.P. Would they not equally apply to pledge
or mortgage followed by foreclosure sale to B.F.P.? Would they
not, indeed, apply to any series of transactions which would give
a good title to the ultimate purchaser in the absence of the flaw
in the first transaction resulting from want of capacity, fraud, etc.?
B. Vendor Has Possession but No Other Title. In the false
inducement (duress, fraud and mistake) cases, the theory on which
we protect the bona :fide purchaser of goods is that his transferor
had "a title," some kind of title. But in early English law possession was nearly the whole title, so that a disseisor of land or chattels could be said to have the property, while the disseisee had
but a right of action. Even today, we say that possession is ownership as against all the world except the one with better title. Might
we not, then, expect protection of the bona fide purchaser from
one in possession, especially in the case of chattels where men
commonly assume ownership in the possessor and make no inquiry as to his title? The civil law of modern Europe starts from
the position that a good faith purchaser from one in possession
of goods gets title. Possession vaut titre. To this rule, exceptions
are admitted. But, as we have seen, our law starts with "the fundamental principle of property which secures the title of the
original owner against wrongful disposition by another." We
also admit exceptions to the rule, and the two bodies of law might
conceivably come to the same results, but that would hardly
, be expected by anyone who realizes how much the mode of approach to a problem influences conclusions. The civil law centers
attention on the position of the purchaser and the appearance presented to him by possession, while Anglo-American law centers
attention on the position of the prior owner and then naturally
emphasizes his conduct rather than the "wrongful disposition by
another."
It would be too much to say that our law is oblivious to the
significance of possession. If one claims to have purchased in
go~d faith and it appears that his transferor did not have possession (neither possession of the goods nor possession of a document
of title such as a bill of lading, which is said to give constructive
possession and which we shall find to be at least as important to
the purchaser as physical possession) the purchaser's good faith is
impugned. On this side, we have given abundant effect to pas-
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session, and have done so in every class of cases-land, goods, negotiable paper, choses in action, and under all the rules of bona
fide purchase. Perhaps this constructive notice factor is stronger
in one type of case than another, but the differences are not conspicuous. Turn the question around, however-ask what we do
for the good faith purchaser from one who had possession, and
the answer must be that we throw him out of court, with exceptions. Here the differences between case and case are extreme.
One who claimed to be a bona fide purchaser of land and showed
nothing but his vendor's possession would not even get to bat. On
the other hand, as we have noted, a good faith purchaser of money
from a possessor scores a home run. With the case of chattels,
no short statement is possible. We must distinguish several situations and several distinct rules of law.
I. English Law of Market Overt. Let us first consider the
English law of market overt. A bona fide purchaser of goods in
any public market or fair (and by local custom this includes every
shop in the city of London) gets good title, subject to certain conditions which we need not discuss further than to say that it makes
no difference whether the seller has legal title or equitable title
or voidable title or no title at all, and it is immaterial whether
the former owner voluntarily parted with possession or suffered
loss or theft, except for the operation of the larceny statute which
applies only upon conviction of the thief. Our colonial forefathers seem to have thought that this piece of the common law
was unsuited to our conditions, for they did not bring it with
them in the Mayflower.
2. Lost or Stolen Goods. Of course the equities of the owner,
as against the bona fide purchaser, vary. The case of lost or stolen
goods is different from the case of goods entrusted by the owner
to the possession of one who proves faithless. French law makes a
sharp distinction here. Possession vaut titre does not apply to lost
or stolen goods. Whether there are other rules which might reach
some of these cases, the editor does not know. German law is in
about the same shape. In our law, market overt being eliminated,
the title to lost or stolen goods is not cut off by bona fide purchase, except (I) in cases involving negotiable documents of title,
which will be discussed hereinafter, and (2) in certain cases where
possession is a sufficient foundation for a paramount lien for
carriage, storage, repair, etc., hereinbefore referred to, and (3)
possibly but improbably in case of negligence of the owner which
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would found estoppel. In these cases of lost or stolen goods, it
appears to be wholly immaterial whether the purchase is from an
established dealer or from a casual vendor.
3. Bailed Goods. The major problem concerns the case where
the owner has entrusted possession to another. If it is an equitable
trust, a bona fide purchaser of the legal title prevails. If it is
merely a bailment, with or without some variety of agency, one
might expect the same result to be reached upon analogy, especially in view of the fact that in chattel cases the appearance
to the purchaser is the same.37 Such is the result reached in French
(and German?) law, as you might anticipate in view of their approach to the problem. But Anglo-American law, looking primarily to the position of the prior owner and insisting that the purchaser claiming an exception "must come within all the conditions on which it depends," has distinguished trust from trust.
If, then, the trust proves to be of the common law variety rather
than the equity variety (that point may itself be a legal battle)
and the case does not fall within the exceptions noted for lost
and stolen goods (which would, of ccmrse, be at least as good
here) the purchaser has an uphill fight.
In the famous case of Pickering v. Busk,38 Lord Ellenborough
attempted an extension of- market overt, though limited to cases
of trusting. He argued that, when goods are delivered by the
owner to a person whose ordinary business is sale of such goods,
authority to sell is to be presumed. It is pretty clear that he meant
that authority to sell is to be conclusively presumed, and meant to

37 Note some of the differences between land and goods. The purchaser of land
normally examines title, and our methods of effecting transfer of land (referring to the
total scheme, product of common law, equity and statute) are such that there are relatively few defects in a vendor's title which are not, on the one hand disclosed, or, on
the other hand, cured either by the equitable doctrine of bona fide purchase or by the
operation of the recording acts. In the case of chattels, however, our methods of effecting
transfer are much more informal, and the recording acts are much more limited in
scope, usually applying only to mortgages and some other security transactions, and even
in the cases to which they apply they are much less informative, because, for instance,
of obstacles to accurate description of goods. The result is that there are many more
situations where defects in vendor's title will neither be disclosed •by examination nor
cured by the equity rule or the recording acts. It should, of course, ·be added, that the
chattel sale is much more likely to be one where the traffic would not bear the cost of
title examination, even if examination would be effective protection. Net result, purchasers of chattels rely, indeed must rely, much more on possession than purchasers of
land.
38 15 East 38, 104 Eng. Rep. 758 (1812).
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include the case of simple bailment for safekeeping or repair. He
apparently felt that authority to pledge should equally be presumed, but he referred to a case where a factor with authority
to sell was held to have no power to pledge, and treated that case
as distinguishable. It should be noted, however, that the other
judges, concurring in the result, placed the decision on the ground
that, in the absence of evidence of express limitation on the seller's
authority, the jury were warranted in finding actual authority to
sell, in which view of the case they regarded it as a material circumstance that the seller was a factor or broker whose ordinary
business was the sale of goods for others. Lord Ellenborough alone
adopted the point of view of the purchaser, who "can only look
to the acts of the parties, and to the external indicia of property,
and not to the private communications which may pass between
a principal and his broker," and even he relied in part on the
peculiar indicia of ownership which, in the case before him,
the owner had conferred upon the seller by having the goods entered in the latter's name in the warehouse. Altogether, this ancient case gives a very broad hint of the present state of the common law. Lord Ellenborough's purchaser-centric views have never
prevailed, and the case is disposed of as a problem in the authority
of the bailee, qua agent.
4. Agency, Implied and Constructive. We have, of course, a
concept of "apparent authority," which at times seems to embody
an estoppel idea and get us beyond the actual authority conferred
on the bailee, but there is much confusion here between constructive authority, based on estoppel, and authority implied in fact,
so that it is often impossible to say whether a reported decision
rests on the one or the other. The very use of the term "authority,"
though coupled with the term "apparent," has focused attention
on the owner's conduct rather than on the position of the purchaser. You can stretch the concept of authority, but, unless you
are peculiarly free from the tyranny of words, you cannot stretch
it very far. We also labor under this difficulty, that the concept of
apparent authority has not been developed as a specific instrument
for dealing with the case of the purchaser who gives value for
goods in the possession of the alleged agent, but has been given
broader shape and is applicable to any type of transaction. This includes cases which are relatively weak in point of justice and
policy, such as the case where the third person deals with the agent
as agent, and does no more. in reliance upon his supposed authority
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than to make a bilateral contract, whereas the purchaser with
whom we are concerned more often deals with the bailee as owner,
and, before he learns of the true situation, has suffered a much
more. drastic change of position. Naturally, the weaker equities of
some of these other cases have tended to hold the doctrine of
apparent authority within narrow bounds. Can we do justice in
cases of purchase from bailee, unless we center our attention upon
the peculiar conditions of these cases, and develop specific doctrine for their solution?
It would, however, be a mistake to suppose that the purchaser's
difficulties turn entirely upon the ineptitude of the doctrine of
apparent authority, for he ordinarily fares no better when he
turns to the large and elastic doctrine of estoppel. In that case, too,
thinking is brought to focus on the owner's behavior, rather than
the purchaser's change of position in reliance on appearances. It
is said that the owner is not estopped merely because his conduct
has in fact misled the purchaser: he must have violated a duty
to the purchaser, or be guilty of bad faith or negligence, or (and
here is, perhaps, the inarticulate major premise, the policy factor, which actuates the decisions) his conduct must be culpable in
that it created an unusually deceptive appearance and lacked the
justification which is furnished by common practice.39 Obviously
estoppel, so defined, will not reach the case where, (1) the only
misleading appearance is that created by the seller's possession
(which may mean ownership or bailment or theft, as every
mother's son should know), and (2) the owner permitted the
seller to have the possession as an incident of that familiar and
wholly legitimate type of transaction known as bailment. As the
law stands, the purchaser cannot do better than to argue apparent
authority, combing the case for shreds of evidence which might
suggest authority in fact, wherewith he may turn to his advantage
the ambiguity of the term "apparent authority.'' 40 Of course the
purchaser may well throw in, with a prayer, the "one of two
innocent persons" formula.

39 See W1LL1sroN, SALES

§312.
point is that evidence from which the jury might find actual authority takes
the case to the jury, and the court's instructions concerning the significance of this
evidence, with exigesis of the phrase "apparent authority," is not likely to register very
effectively. The difficulty of doctrinal statement of the law of apparent authority will
become evident upon perusal of MECHEM, AGENCY, 2d ed., §720 et seq. (1903).
40 The
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Such being the intellectual tools which the judges have used,
it is not surprising that they have distinguished between one bailment and another, the distinctions turning on the actual authority
conferred on the bailee though actual authority is not made the
sole criterion of decision. For example, a sale by a bailee who has
authority to sell but exceeds the limitations on his authority, is
distinguished from a pledge by a bailee who has plenary authority
to sell but no authority to pledge. In the one case, the principal
is attempting to divide the juristic atom, authority to sell, and his
instructions are spoken of as "secret" limitations on the agent's
authority, but, in the other case, the principal merely asks us
to distinguish two very different atoms, authority to sell and authority to pledge, and the limitation is not called "secret." The
word "secret" connotes deception, but, in point of ~eception, is
there any difference, even of degree, between these cases? Naturally,
either sale or pledge by a bailee for safekeeping, or for use,
is quite beyond the pale, unless the bailee has been given unusual
indicia of ownership. In our disposition of these problems, no
sharp distinction has been drawn between purchase from an established merchant or broker and purchase from a vagabond.
There is, of course, a difference, but it merely goes to color the
authority of the seller, his authority implied or apparent. It leaves
us miles from Lord Ellenborough and market overt.41 What is the law in action in these cases of common law trust?
That is a mystery to the editor. The rules of law throw up difficult
fact questions. The normal remedies are legal, as distinguished
from equitable, and that brings in the jury. Perhaps the typical
case will make the purchaser's primary problem one of getting
to the jury, with tactical resemblance to the typical negligence
action. Then one must remember the fugitive nature of chattels,
which may dispose of all questions of legal rights, and the triviality of many chattel cases, which may make the prosecution of
actions unprofitable. Is the net conclusion that possession is at least
nine points of the law?
5. Factors' Acts. In a few states we have factors' acts, which
carry us a step from the common law. The following are the im-

41 For further particulars, see WILLISTON, SALES §313 et seq.; MECHEM, AGENCY, 2d
ed., §§704-1078 (1903); Waite, "Caveat Emptor and the Judicial Process," 25 CoL. L. REv.
129 (1925).
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portant clauses of the New York statute,42 which is fairly typical
of this somewhat varied legislation.
"1. Every factor or other agent, entrusted with the possession of any bill of lading, custom-house permit, or warehouseman's receipt for the delivery of any merchandise, and every
sµch factor or agent not having the documentary evidence of
title, who shall be intrusted with the possession of any merchandise for the purpose of sale, or as a security for any advances to be made or obtained thereon, shall be deemed to be
the true owner thereof, so far as to give validity to any contrac~ made by such agent with any other person, for the sale
or disposition of the whole or any part of such merchandise
and any account receivable or other chose in action created by
sale or other disposition of such merchandise, for any money
advanced, or negotiable instrument or other obligation in
writing given by such other person upon the faith thereof.
"2. Every person who shall hereafter accept or take any such
merchandise and any account receivable or other chose in
action created by sale or other disposition of such merchandise
in deposit from any such agent, as a security for any antecedent debt or demand, shall not acquire thereby, or enforce any
right or interest in or to such merchandise and any account
receivable or other chose in action created by sale or other
disposition of such merchandise or document, other than was
possessed or might have been enforced by such agent at the
time of such deposit.

"4. Nothing contained in this section shall authorize a common carrier, warehouseman, or other person to whom merchandise or other property may be committed for transportation or storage only, to sell or hypothecate the same."
Aside from the reference to documents of title, does this
statute draw any distinctions between the several types of entrusting? Does it distinguish between dealers and others? Does it distinguish between purchase in the ordinary sense and purchase by
way of security? How much common law do you suppose would
be read into the statute? If pledgees and mortgagees are protected,
may it not be that the most important function of the statute is
precisely the protection of this class of purchasers?43

42
43

[40 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1949) §43.]
For .further light on factors' acts, see WILLISTON,

SALES

§320 et seq.
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C. Vendor Holds Documents of Title. The common law, working with its theories of estoppel and apparent authority, has given
some weight to indicia of ownership other than possession. For
example, in Pickering v. Busk44 it was thought significant that the
owner had placed the goods in warehouse in the name of the agent.
That meant more to the court than mere possession of the goods.
We cannot attempt even to catalog the sundry circumstances
which have had like effect in the decisions, but we must examine
that commonest type of case, where the vendor holds a bill of
lading or a warehouse receipt. Here the prime question is whether,
and how far, the law adopts the views of merchants and bankers,
who not only treat the document as representative of the goods so
that, for example, transfer of the document is considered as a
delivery of the goods, but also assume that the ·document means.
what it says with respect to the ultimate right to get the goods,
reading the words "bearer" and "order" in the sense made familiar by bills of exchange and promissory notes. Dealing with bona
fide purchase of such documents, judicial opinions have been so
divergent as to constitute two distinct schools of thought, which
are referred to as the common law theory and the mercantile
theory. The former tends to assimilate transfer of the document
of title to delivery of the goods themselves. The latter tends to
assimilate transfer of such documents to negotiation of bills of
exchange. Each proposition must be put in this guarded form,
for exact equation is not reached on either side. Neither should.
it be supposed that the two views give divergent results in all cases.
Even on the common law theory, a purchaser from one to whom
the owner entrusted a document of title would probably prevail,.
estoppel being predicated on the owner's conduct as something
more misleading than delivery of possession of goods. On the other
hand, if the document was lost by, or stolen from the owner, or if
the goods were lost or stolen, and the thief or finder bailed them
and procured a document of title, it is by no means clear that a
purchaser of that document would be protected under the mercantile theory. 45 All that can be said, in broad generalization, is.

15 East 38, 104 Eng. Rep. 758 (1812).
The distinction between the owner who has entrusted his goods to the vendor,
and the owner who has suffered theft or loss, is conspicuous in the cases which involve
documents of title, though almost wholly ignored in other cases.
44
45
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that we have two schools of thought, and their two lines of thinking are significant for some case_s.
__ In recent years, we have had much legislation touching documents of title, but it requires careful reading. Not all of the statutes are as forthright as the following provision of the Uniform
Bills of Lading Act- [§31]:
·
"A negotiable bill may be negotiated by any person in
possession of the same, however such possession may have
- heen acquired if, by the terms of the bill, the carrier under- takes to deliver the goods to the order of such person, or if at
the time of negotiation the bill is in such form that it may
_ be negotiated by delivery."
· Reference should also be made to the Federal Bills of Lading
Act, the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, the Uniform Sales
Act, and miscellaneous local statutes. Some of these (including
some of the· Uniform acts) go no further than to protect the purchaser where there has been some element of trusting by the
owner, but even then are important, more or less so according to
the antecedent state of the local law. Whatever the state of the
legislation, one can safely make the vague assertion that quasinegotiability is conferred upon documents of title. 46 Although the
law regarding 'documents of title is but a small corner in the legal
picture of bona fide purchase, its practical significance is very
great because almost all large scale goods business and some small
scale business use the mechanism of bills of lading and warehouse
receipts. Does this mean that big business is better protected than
small business, and that, as usual, the ultimate consumer is way
out at the dirty end o_f the stick? Before one climbs onto that soap
box, he should note the practical factors protecting the purchaser
of shoe strings. But how - about the retail purchaser of an
automobile?
D. Vendor Retaining Possession After f'revious Sale. The case
is this:-V sells chattels to P(l) and the parties intend immediate
transfer of ownership which, as matter of law, effects immediate
transfer of ownership, hut V retains possession and later sells the
same chattels to P(2), a bona fide purchaser. In the separation of
possession from general ownership, and sale by the possessor, you
see at once a resemblance to the case of sale by a bailee. Or would

46 For

general discussion, see

WILLISTON, SALES

§§405--444.

1959]

PRIORITIBS

701

you say that this is a case of sale by a bailee? That would be entirely
logical, but the vendor retaining possession is not ordinarily
called a bailee, at least when the question raised is that of the title
acquired by a second purchaser. And it would be confusing rather
than helpful to call it bailment, because the law applicable to this
case is quite different from that which applies to the typical
bailment case.47
Legal relatives of the case now in hand are found in quite another quarter, viz. in fraud on creditors. There are many kinds of
fraud on creditors which have but a remote relationship to our
bona fide purchase case, but there is one which is own brother to
it. In our initial hypothetical, above, substitute advance of credit
by C to V, in place of the sale by V to P(2), and there it is.
In both the creditor and the purchaser cases, one finds two distinguishable lines of thought. One heads up in the telling phrases
"ostensible ownership" and "reputed ownership." It is essentially
an estoppel idea. P(l) is responsible for the deceptive appearance
of ownership in Vandis _estopped in favor of V's creditor or subsequent purchaser who has changed his position in reliance on
that appearance. Estoppel by assisted misrepresentation, Ewart
would say. But is the appearance any more deceptive than in the
case of any bailment? Perhaps in some degree. One who knew that
V was owner, when he was in fact owner, might readily assume
continued ownership as long as V had possession, though he would
not assume acquisition of ownership of all goods which had come
into V's possession. Perhaps so. But there is at least as much room
for differentiation at the other end. Bailment for safekeeping, for
service, for use, or for sale, is probably a more common, a more
normal business transaction than retention of possession by a vendor. The law must make place for normal business arrangements,
hut need not so favor freak transactions. If that is not enough to
reconcile the application of the estoppel to vendor's retention of
possession-with refusal to apply it to ordinary hailments, you may
write this down as another of the numerous historical accidents
which enliven the law of priorities.

47 If V delivered possession to P(l), who immediately redelivered it to V, that would
be called retention of possession, and treated accordingly. On the other hand, if a sufficient interval (say a year) elapsed between delivery to P(l) and his redelivery, that would
be cal1ed bailment and treated differently. This is not the place to try to fix the line
between the two kinds of cases.
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But are the creditor and purchaser cases quite alike, from the
estoppel point of view? P(2) relied on immediate acquisition of
ownership from V at the very moment that he parted with value.
But the creditor, even the creditor who extended credit to V in
the interval after his sale to P(l) and before delivery of possession,
could not, if he knew his way around, rely on this property in the
same sense. He ought to have known that even if V actually owned
the property then, he might not own it by the time he, the creditor,
had occasion to levy on it. Granted that a man's present assets
mean something to those who are asked to give him credit, and
even to those who have already given him credit, they mean much
more to one who is purchasing those assets. That is why the careful lender regards a present mortgage or pledge as better than an
unsecured debt. This being so, the close assimilation of creditor
and purchaser cases is rather surprising. P.erhaps it would not
have occurred if estoppel had been the sole line of thinking on
these problems, but there is another approach on which the two
cases are identical.
The other line of thought heads up in another telling phrase,
"badge of fraud." The idea is that retention of possession by an
alleged vendor founds an inference, or at least a suspicion, that the
alleged sale was not a sale at all, but a sham. This, you will see,
makes of the case not the thing we started with in our initial
hypothetical, viz. sale by V to P(l) with retention of possession by
V, but rather its opposite, pretended sale by V to P(l) with retention of ownership by V. So long as you think of these things in the
manner of the hypothetical case, where facts are facts, you will
have difficulty in getting the relation of the two lines of thought
we are examining. You must think of the case as it comes up in
court, where facts are alleged and evidenced but never proved in
the fullest sense. In that situation, it is possible to say to P(l)
either of these two things, (1) granting that there was a sale, you
are estopped from setting it up, or (2) we don't believe there was
any sale. Indeed, it would not be absurd to say both of these things.
The two ideas are not repugnant to each other: they drive in the
same general direction.
Yet the two ideas are not equivalent. If the estoppel idea is
applied, does it not lead to the conclusion that the prior purchaser
is absolutely precluded from setting up his purchase as against
creditor or later purchaser? On the other hand, if we use the
"badge of fraud" idea, is it not an open question whether we
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should regard the badge as conclusively establishing fraud, or only
creating a prima fade presumption of fraud, or merely as evidence
of fraud? In fact each of these views concerning the effect of the
badge has been asserted by the courts. Of course their results are
not necessarily different. That depends on the circumstances of
the case.
With these two principal lines of thought, roughly similar but
not interchangeable, and with divergence of opinion concerning
the effect of the fraud theory, confusion of authority is naturally
extreme. Further complication results from legislation, which is
various.48
Before we leave retention of possession, we should note that
land stands on an entirely different footing from chattels. This
may be attributed in part to the fact that the fraud statutes have
often discriminated between the two, but it would seem to be
chiefly due to market practice, modes of transfer, etc. There are
early cases, both English and American, which make out fraud in
the retention of possession by a vendor of land, and there are some
statutes which lump land and chattels. Nevertheless, it is doubtful
whether retention of possession of land is really significant anywhere, except that it makes possible bona fide purchase under the
equity rule or the recording acts, which could not be if possession
had been delivered to the first purchaser. Is it necessary to say
that in other cases than retention of possession by a vendor, mere
possession of land, as by a tenant for life, for years or at will, or
by a disseisor, is not a basis of bona fide purchase? Even in the days
when seisin was practically synonymous with property, that was so.
RECORDING ACTS: LAND

We now turn to examine the recording system, first for land.
It is obviously dangerous to discuss at large forty-eight statutes, no
two of which are exactly alike, but behind endless variations in
detail one can see a common structure in the recording acts, and
something coming out of them which may be called the recording
system. We should begin by sampling the statutes or, to speak
more exactly, sampling the vital provisions of the statutes, for the
bulk of every recording act is devoted to the organization of the

48 See 2 MECHEM, SALES §979 et seq. (1901).
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recorder's office, and such like business. It may, however, be well
to issue a warning that in many states there has been in the course
of time amendment of the vitals of the statute, and the amendments have not always been incorporated into the amended sections nor thereto cited in the compilations. For example, Mich.
Comp. Laws (1929), §13309 [Mich. Comp. Laws (1948)
§565.35], defining the conveyances which must be recorded, still
carries the old provision excluding land contracts, and there is no
reference to the act of 1879 (C. L. §13353, et seq.) [Mich. Comp.
Laws (1948) §565.354] which, by a generous interpretation, repeals the older provision. The moral is that you should not
reach hasty conclusions as to what are the vital provisions of a
particular statute.

Consolidated Laws of New York (McKinney), Chap. 52
(Real Property Law), Art. 9, §290 [50 N.Y. Consol. Laws
(McKinney, 1945) art. 9, §290]: 1. The term "real property,"
as used in this article, includes lands, tenements and hereditaments and chattels real, except a lease for a term not exceeding three years.
2. The term "purchaser" includes every person to whom
any estate or interest in real property is conveyed for a valuable consideration, and every assignee of a mortgage, lease or
other conditional estate.
3. The term "conveyance" includes every written instrument, by which any estate or interest in real property is created, transferred, mortgaged or assigned, or by which the title
to any real property may be affected, including an instrument in execution of a power, although the power be one of
revocation only, and an instrument postponing or subordinating a mortgage lien; except a will, a lease for a term not exceeding three years, an ex_ecutory contract for the sale or purchase of lands, and an instrument containing a power to convey real property as the agent or attorney for the owner of
such property.
§291. A conveyance of real property, within the state, on
being duly acknowledged by the person executing the same,
or proved as required by this chapter, and such acknowledgment or proof duly certified when required by this chapter,
may be recorded in the office of the clerk of the county where
such real property is situated, and such county clerk shall,
upon the request of any party, on tender of the lawful fees
therefor, record the same in his said office. Every such conveyance not so recorded is void as against any subsequent pur-
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chaser in good faith and for a valuable consideration, from
the same vendor, his heirs or devisees, of the same real
property or any portion thereof, whose conveyance is first
duly recorded.
.

*

*

*

*

*

*

§315. Different sets of books must be provided by the
recording officer of each county, for the recording of deeds
and mortgages; in one of which sets he must record all conveyances and other instruments absolute in their terms delivered to him, pursuant to law, to be so recorded, which are
not intended as mortgages, or securities in the nature of mortgages, and in the other set, such mortgages and securities
delivered to him.
§316. Each recording officer must provide, at the expense
of his county, proper books for making general indexes of
instruments recorded in his office, and must form indexes
therein, so as to afford correct and easy reference to the books
of record in his office. There must be one set of indexes for
mortgages or securities in the nature of mortgages, and another set for conveyances and other instruments not intended
as such mortgages or securities. Each set must contain two
lists in alphabetical order, one consisting of the names of the
grantors or mortgagors, followed by the names of their grantees or mortgagees, and the other list consisting of the names
of the grantees or mortgagees, followed by the names of their
grantors or mortgagors, with proper blanks in each class of
names, for subsequent entries, which entries must be made
as instruments are delivered for record. . . .
§317. Order of recording. Every instrument, entitled to
be recorded, must be recorded by the recording officer in the
order and as of the time of its delivery to him therefor, and
is considered recorded from the time of such delivery.
§324. Effect of recording assignment of mortgage. The
recording of an assignment of a mortgage is not in itself a
notice of such assignment to a mortgagor, his heirs or personal representatives, so as to invalidate a payment made by
either of them to the mortgagee.
Revised Statutes of Illinois (Cahill, 1933), Chap. 30, §29
[Ill. Rev. Stat. (1957) c. 30, §27]. Deeds, mortgages, powers
of attorney, and other instruments relating to or affecting the
title to real estate in this state, shall be recorded in the county
in which such real estate is situated; but if such county is
not organized, then in the county to which such unorganized
county is attached for judicial purposes.
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§31 [§29]. All deeds, mortgages and other instruments of
writing which are authorized to be recorded, shall take effect
and be in force from and after the time of filing the same for
record, and not before, as to all creditors and subsequent
purchasers, without notice; and all such deeds and title papers
shall be adjudged void as to all such creditors and subsequent
purchasers, without notice, until the same shall be filed for
record.
§32 [§30]. Deeds, mortgages and other instruments of
writing relating to real estate shall be deemed, from the time
of being filed for record, notice to subsequent purchasers and
creditors, though not acknowledged or proven according to
law; but the same shall not be read as evidence, unless their
execution be proved in the manner required by the rules
of evidence applicable to such writings, so as to supply the
defects of such acknowledgment or proof.
General Laws of Massachusetts (1932), Chap. 183, §4
[amended, Laws 1941, p. 85, Mass. Laws Ann. (1955) c. 183,
§4]. A conveyance of an estate in fee simple, fee tail or for life,
or a lease for more than seven years from the making thereof,
shall not be valid as against any person, except the grantor or
lessor, his heirs and devisees and persons having actual notice
of it, unless it, or an office copy as provided in section thirteen
of chapter thirty-six, is recorded in the registry of deeds for
the county or district in which the land to which it relates
lies.
General Code of Ohio (1926) §8542 [amended, Ohio
Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1958) §5301.23]. All mortgages, executed agreeably to the provisions of this chapter, shall be recorded in the office of the recorder of the county in which
the mortgaged premises are situated, and take effect from
the time they are delivered to the recorder of the proper
county for record. If two or more mortgages are presented
for record on the same day, they shall take effect from the
order of presentation for record. The first presented must be
the first recorded, and the first recorded shall have preference.
§8543 [amended, Ohio Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1958)
§5301.25]. All other deeds and instruments of writing for the
conveyance or incumbrance of lands, tenements, or hereditaments, executed agreeably to the provisions of this chapter,
shall be recorded in the office of the recorder of the county
in which the premises are situated, and until so recorded or
filed for record, they shall be deemed fraudulent, so far as
relates to a subsequent bona fide purchaser having, at the
time of purchase, no knowledge of the existence of such
former deed or instrument.
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It will be observed that each of these statutes has these features: (1) it authorizes, by implication at least, the recording of
certain instruments affecting title to land, and (2) it declares that
such instruments not so recorded shall be inoperative, at least
as against certain (or do you think it uncertain?) persons. (3) The
Illinois statute also declares that the record of such instruments
shall be notice to subsequent purchasers and creditors, the New
York statute assumes a general rule of notice and states an exception, while the others are silent on this point.
Notice by Record. Let us first get out of the way the relatively unimportant subject of notice by record. It is perfectly
settled that the record imparts notice, even though the statute is
wholly silent on the point. This may be viewed as a special application of a general rule concerning notice of public records.
Our simple statement assumes that the instrument is one the
record of which is authorized by the statute-otherwise it seems to
be settled that the record does not impart notice-and it also
assumes that the record is properly made-erroneous records
raise a difficult question. But the chief problem is to determine to
whom and under what circumstances record is notice. Suppose an
application for fire insurance contained fraudulent statements
regarding the applicant's title to the premises: could the defense
of fraud be answered by record notice to the insurer of the actual
state of the title, even if the statute said (as several do say) that
record is "notice to all persons"? Suppose the fraudulent statements were made to a purchaser of the land: could the vendor
escape the consequences on the ground that the victim was
charged with notice of the defect of title, even if the statute said
"notice to purchasers"? Suppose a credit statement contains claims
of ownership of land which the debtor does not own at all,
and the statute says "notice to creditors"? Whether the statute'
says this or that or nothing at all about notice, is it not necessary
for the court to work out a doctrine of notice based on policy
and justice? If it does, where will it come out? We shall not
attempt to fight out this problem because, as previously observed,
notice is a relatively unimportant phase of the recording system.
There is a tendency among students, and one even sees it in
judicial opinions, to make record notice the central point of the
recording system. It is submitted, however, that this is seriously
misleading. Take the simple case where grantee A records his
deed and the grantor subsequently sells to B: it can be said that A
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prevails because B has notice of A's deed, but is it not at least as
sound to say that A prevails because his deed was prior in time
and there is nothing in the case to take it out of the primary rule
of priority? Suppose that A had not rec?rded and B purchased in
good faith: if it is argued that B prevails because he has no notice
.of A's deed, the argument is incomplete since it is clear that purchasers without notice do not necessarily get good title, and leaving the case on that basis tends to confuse all one's notions about
priorities. Is it not better to say that B prevails because the statute
says that the unrecorded deed is void as against the good faith
purchaser? Notice from the record is important in some cases
(e.g. where it precludes bona fide purchase under the old equity
rule) but it should not be thought of as a primary feature of the
recording system.49 Of course we should not make a fetish of
this point. When it is convenient to argue a case in terms of record
notice we will do so, even though that is not the soundest analysis
of the case. But we must not let that distort our thinking.
We can easily define the cases in which record notice is really
a critical factor. They are the cases where (I) the recording act has
no application except for its notice function, and (2) some other
rule of law makes notice relevant. For example: V conveys land
to P(l) without receiving full payment and the local law, we
will assume, creates an equitable grantor's lien for the unpaid
price. Then P(I) sells and conveys to P(2), a bona fide purchaser.
It is difficult to say that the recording act avoids V's lien, because
there is no "conveyance" (New York statute) or "deed, mortgage
or other instrument of writing" (Illinois statute) which has not
been recorded. But, V's lien being merely equitable, P(2) is
protected by the equity rule of bona fide purchase unless he
has notice of the lien. Notice, then, is the crux of the case, and if
V put into his deed to P(l) a recital that the purchase price had
not been paid, or if he can get onto the record (effectively, by
a legally recordable instrument) an acknowledgment to the same
effect by P(l), he is secure.
Recordable Instruments: Undocumented Interests. The points
in the recording acts which demand serious attention are those
on which every statute is fairly explicit, viz. the instruments

49 See Aigler, "Operation of the Recording Acts," 22 MrcH. L. REV. 405 (1924).
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that are recordable and the effect of failure to record them. On
the first point, the statute may contain a rather elaborate enumeration of conveyances or it may be very concise. In either case,
the terms used may be such as to clearly embrace all instruments
affecting title to land, or they may be such as to make that
doubtful, to say the least.
Can you find in any of our sample statutes anything except
a provision for recording certain written instruments affecting
title? Then, when you tum to the second point, can you find
anything except a declaration that recordable instruments are
void, as against certain persons, if not recorded? The question
becomes material in the case of the purchaser who finds that
there is an outstanding claim which was not created by or derived
through a recordable instrument, but "by operation of law." We
have already put one such case, that of the implied grantor's lien.
There are many others: e.g. the claim of an heir of a former
owner, purchaser's title derived from persons supposed to be the
sole heirs; e.g. widow claiming dower, purchaser's title derived
from husband during coverture, or from heirs and/or administrator after husband's death; e.g. title acquired by adverse possession or easement acquired by prescription. In the cases last
mentioned, there will usually be such possession or physical
enjoyment as to convey notice and preclude bona fide purchase,
but the case is not unknown where the adverse possessor abandons
possession after acquiring title, and some recording acts make
notice by possession immaterial.
Note that, in the cases put in the last paragraph, the purchaser
can not fall back on the equitable doctrine of b.f.p. because our
law has not worked out the rights of the primary parties (vendor
and true owner) in terms of legal and equitable interests. It is
otherwise with such undocumented interests as that of the defrauded vendor or the unpaid vendor who has an impli~d lien.
That will help out purchasers but not creditors: as to the latter,
the question of the recording act is critical.
Do you think a court might work out an estoppel to assert an
undocumented claim because the purchaser was misled by the
record? On this point might we distinguish, for example, the
case of constructive trust based on fraud, from, for example, the
case of implied grantor's lien for purchase money?
Would you expect any court, by liberal interpretation or
by estoppel, to make the recording act operate as if it read, "a
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bona fide purchaser shall get the title which, on the record, his
vendor appears to have"?50
Persons Against Whom the Unrecorded Instrument Is Void.
Given an instrument which is recordable, but not recorded, under
what conditions and in favor of what persons is it avoided? Except
for the mortgage section of the Ohio statute, which is a very rare
bird, you will see that all of our samples attempt some kind of
specification of the persons who can avoid the unrecorded instrument. In doing this, they exhibit two methods. They may describe
the classes of persons for whose benefit (against whom) the unrecorded instrument is avoided, or they may declare the unrecorded instrument void as against all persons except those of
described classes. The two types are about equally common.
A. Under Statutes Which Describe These Persons: (1) Purchasers. Statutes of this type always name "purchasers." They
may add qualifying clauses, "in good faith," "without notice," or
"without actual notice." The more general terms are, of course,
interpreted in the light of the equity rule of bona fide purchase.
The terms "actual notice" may be interpreted strictly, or much
of the traditional learning about constructive notice may be read
into them-after all, where is the line between actual knowledge,
on the one hand, and actual suspicion and knowledge which
almost inevitably creates suspicion, on the other hand?51 Again, the
term "purchaser" may or may not be qualified by "for value,"
or the like. With or without such dressing, the requirement of
value is asserted by the courts, and the old case law as to what
constitutes value is read into the statute, so that mere promise
is not enough and security or payment of an antecedent debt is
a ticket to a fight. You will, however, find that the judgment
creditor purchasing at his own execution sale is almost always
protected.
Some of the statutes express a further requirement, purchase
"from the same vendor," "from the same vendor, his heirs or
devisees," or "from the same vendor, his heirs, devisees or assigns."

50 Material on some of the foregoing questions may 1be found in Durfee and Fleming, "Res Judicata and Recording Acts," 28 MICH. L. REv. 811 at 836 et seq. (1930), where
it is used analogically for the solution of cases not involving good faith purchase but
good faith suit.
51See TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 2d ed., §§568, 569, 573 (1920). Even actual notice
seems to be immaterial in North Carolina. See N.C. Code (1931) §§3309, 3311, and cases
there cited.
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Does it make any difference which of these phrases is used, or
whether any of them is used? Would any court, under any statute,
protect a purchaser whose chain of title did not lead back to the
transferor in the unrecorded conveyance? or refuse to protect a
purchaser whose chain of title did so, e.g. a purchaser from
grantee or heir of the party who executed the unrecorded conveyance?52 The New York statute (widely copied-the formula
first appeared in the Rev. Stat. of 1828) adds to the other qualifications of the purchaser the clause "whose conveyance is first
duly recorded." The obvious idea was to put a premium on
prompt recording. But is it fair, e.g. in a case where the first
grantee, after delaying record for weeks or months, gets his conveyance on record one day after bona fide purchase has intervened
and one day before the later comer records? Even with this type
of statute, is the recording system adequately stated in the formula
that the party who first records has priority?
In the points heretofore reviewed, it is obvious that the recording acts are closely related to the chancery rule of bona fide
purchase. One suspects that the whole scheme was inspired by
the equity rule, and it is certain that the equity cases have been
used in the interpretation of the statutes. There are, however,
some striking points of difference between the two bodies of law.
The equity rule makes much of the distinction between legal titles
and equities or equitable estates. None of the recording acts
have in terms drawn that distinction, and there are only a few
decisions which have imported it from the older learning. And
this goes for both ends of the statute. A prior legal interest created
by a recordable instrument is as readily avoided as a prior equitable interest similarly created, and a subsequent purchaser of
an equitable interest is as fully protected as a subsequent purchaser of legal title, subject to the qualification that if he does not
get a recordable instrument he is in difficulty under that type of
statute which carries the clause, "whose conveyance is first duly
recorded." Furthermore, the recording acts do not, in terms,
deal with anything but record and nonrecord of instruments
affecting title, and it is not easy (putting it mildly) to get beyond
the terms of the statutes. On the other hand, the equity rule has

52 See
(1890).

TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY,

2d ed., §567 (1920);

WEBB, RECORD OF TITLE

§214
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no such feature. The "implied" equities, such as constructive
trust and equitable lien, are cut down at least as readily as an
express trust created by deed. Would it not seem that the differences between the two bodies of law are quite as significant as their
resemblances?
What is the relation between the recording acts and the doctrine of estoppel? The definition of estoppel requires change
of position in reliance upon appearances created or permitted by
the party to be estopped, and the factor of reliance is often sharply
insisted on (so that, for example, action in ignorance of the misleading conduct of the estoppee is not enough) though in certain
types of case the requirement is relaxed. 53 But there are several
square decisions that an unrecorded conveyance is void as against
a subsequent purchaser without notice whether he examined the
record and was misled, or did not examine the record. 54 The
writer knows no decision to the contrary. Is this to be regarded as
a merely mechanical application of the letter of the statute, or is
it justified by administrative convenience? Although reliance is
unnecessary in a case which comes within the terms of the statute,
reliance on the records may help a purchaser who can not make
a case within those terms. In lviarling v. Nommensen, 55 the subsequent purchaser could not satisfy the statutory requirements
because he had not "first duly recorded his conveyance," but he
proved that he had, before his purchase, examined the record.
It was held that the prior grantee was estopped. The decision is
extraordinary in that the estoppel was based on the provisions
of the statute although the statute did not in itself apply to the
case. But does it not fit in nicely with those cases which have
declined to read all of the old law of bona fide purchase into
the statutes, e.g. as to purchase at execution sale? All can be said
to embody generous development of the policy of the legislation,
instead of mechanical application of its terms.
(2) Creditors. Even those creditors who have fixed a lien on
the land by attachment, judgment or execution, are not purchasers, either under the equity rule or under the statutes. Some-

63 EWART, EsrOPPEL 132, 140 et seq.
54 James v. Newman, 147 Iowa 574,

(1900).
126 N.W. 781 (1910); Watts v. Lundeen, 165 Minn.
300, 206 N.W. 444 (1925); Ebling Brewing Co. v. Gennaro, 189 App. Div. 782, 179 N.Y.S.
384 (1919).
55 127 Wis. 363, 106 N.W. 844 (1906).
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times a creditor has been protected by the use of an estoppel
theory in conjunction with a "purchaser" recording act, in the
manner of Marling v. Nommensen. 56 More important, many
recording acts name as their beneficiaries not only purchasers but
also creditors. Creditors may be named simpliciter, or with qualifications, as "existing creditors," "subsequent creditors," "judgment creditors," etc. But, whatever its terms, this branch of the
statute requires interpretation.
In the cases, one finds two principal lines of thought: (I) The
creditors who should be protected are those who, if not actually
misled by an examination of the record, were at least in a position
where they might have been misled if they had examined the
record. Within this description are, obviously, those who gave
credit to the record owner after the execution of the instrument
and before its record; less obviously, those who gave credit before
the execution of the instrument and might have indulged the
debtor in reliance upon his apparent continued ownership. (2)
The second idea is that the creditors who should be protected
are those who, like purchasers, acquired an interest in the land
after the execution of the instrument and before its record, which
means those who, in this fatal interval, obtained liens by attachment, judgment, execution or creditor's bill. Under either of
these views, a creditor must obtain a judgment before he is in a
position to launch an attack upon the unrecorded conveyance,
but that procedural requirement is an entirely different thing.
The first of these two ideas is readily seen to involve interpretation of the statute in the light of the principle of estoppel. One
can see something of the elements of estoppel in levy of process
or prosecution of creditor's bill (involving outlay of effort and
money) in the interval while the instrument is unrecorded, but
it is, to say the least, no stronger than the estoppel element in
the other cases. Therefore, the second idea (viz. that it is only
those acquiring liens in the fatal interval who are to be protected)
can not be reconciled with estoppel principles. 57 It is, however,
the prevailing rule that only those who acquire liens in the fatal

56 Ibid. And see 28 YALE L. J. 685 (1919).
57Note that a subsequent creditor, meaning one who gives credit in the interval of
non record, can not satisfy this rule unless he moves very fast or the interval is very long.
Prior creditors are much more likely to make the grade. Yet subsequent creditors have
the stronger case, from the point of view of prejudicial change of position.
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interval are protected. If the statute does not explicitly dictate
this rule, and few of the statutes do so, whence does it come? It
seems to be the product of a conveyancing approach to the statute.
The idea must be that the whole statute deals with priority of title
to land; or, more precisely, ·the statute creates an exception to
the primary canon of priority, by virtue of which a later transferee
shall, under the stated conditions, prevail. Thus creditors are
equated to purchasers, and neither can take advantage of nonrecord unless he acquired an interest in the land during the interval of nonrecord. The major premise of this argument is sound;
without doubt, the business of the statutes is priorities. But where
do we go from here? Problems in priority have not always been
dealt with in this manner. As we have seen, some courts have
protected the purchaser who parted with his money in good
faith, though he received notice before he got his conveyance.
Again, and nearer to the point, creditors .have sometimes achieved
priority because of ostensible ownership (e.g. retention of possession by seller of goods) existing at the time they gave credit, though
removed before they levied. 58 Are we not facing a question which
is basic to bona fide purchase and all its relatives, the question
whether we will shape the rules in the image of estoppel and
make them turn on change of position in reliance on appearances,
or allow them to crystallize in forms which bear no more than a
family resemblance to·estoppel? Surely the former is the preferable
course, in the absence of particular conditions which give a
countervailing advantage to a rule· of thumb. Is there any such
counter factor in the case . in hand?
Thinking this through, you will see that a serious problem
arises· if we make the unrecorded conveyance void as against prior
creditors (meaning those who gave credit before the conveyance
was executed) even though they do not levy within the period
between execution and recording of the conveyance. Every transferor owes some debts, we may suppose, and all his existing creditors will, under the rule we are considering, instantly acquire incipient priority over the transferee, no matter how brief the interval between execution and record of the transfer. At their leisure,
then, they can levy on the property and enjoy priority over the
transferee. If we let in prior creditors at all (and the same thing

58 See

2

MECHEM, SALES

§963 (1901).
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goes for subsequent creditors, though with less weight), should we
not introduce a time-factor-restrict avoidance to the case where
a conveyance is withheld from the record for a stated period, or for
an unreasonable period? But that would not be a politic rule
with respect to subsequent purchasers. Some of the early recording acts did have this feature in their purchaser provisions, but
we soon came to see that, as between the prior transferee and
the subsequent bona fide purchaser, it was better to say that no
matter how fast the former stepped, the latter would prevail if
he purchased in the interval of nonrecord. It comes, then, to this:
if we are going to protect both purchasers and creditors by the
recording acts, we need distinctly different provisions for the
two cases. But legislatures have usually indulged their vicious taste
for short and pithy statutes, giving us one curt provision for both
purchasers and creditors. That fairly forces the courts to read down
the creditor clause to something less than its face value. Perhaps
this is the explanation of the not altogether satisfactory decisions
which deny the protection of the statutes to creditors who have
not levied in the interval of nonrecord.
B. Under Statutes Which Describe the Persons Against Whom
the Unrecorded Conveyance Is Valid. What you might call the
backhanded type of statute, declares that the unrecorded conveyance shall be valid as against designated persons, and void as to
all others. The enumeration of persons who can not take advantage
of nonrecord always starts with the parties to the instrument, always adds other persons having notice (perhaps saying "actual
notice"), often adds heirs and devisees of the parties, and sometimes (?) adds donees. Purchasers and creditors are never named.
Now it is obvious that these statutes require drastic interpretation
and they have received it. It has, for example, been uniformly
(in the few decisions) held that they do not protect heirs, devisees or donees, even though such persons are not included in
the enumeration. On the other hand, they clearly protect bona
fide purchasers. The frame of the statute, escaping the use of the
terms "good faith" and "purchaser," with their crystallized definitions, might have let in a new and more inclusive concept of bona
fide purchase, but the editor does not know to what extent, if at
all, this has actually happened. Certainly much of the old learning
has been read into the backhanded statute, and general discussions
of the recording acts seldom distinguish cases on the basis of
the two types of legislation. Yet, on any arguable question (for ex-
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ample, on a mortgage for an antecedent debt) a lawyer should
not hesitate to argue for a liberal interpretation of this type
of statute, distinguishing decisions under the other kind of
legislation.
What about creditors? Though some courts have denied them
protection (in large part these decisions rest upon a reading of
the recording act in conjunction with other statutory provisions
touching the effect of judgments etc.) creditors are usually let in.
Priority is, however, usually limited to those creditors who acquire a lien by attachment, etc., in the interval of nonrecord.
A word about that mortgage section of the Ohio statute. By
the letter, the unrecorded mortgage is wholly inoperative, but that
is strong meat. It seems to have been made clear in the decisions
that the unrecorded mortgage is effective as against the mortgagor,
and it is probably so as against his heirs, devisees and donees.
There are decisions to the effect that it is ineffective as against purchasers with notice, but would that be followed all the way down
to actual knowledge? As to creditors, conveyancing ideas have
again been at work. See annotation of the section in Page's Code.
Nonrecord as Against Subsequent Suitors. A typical case: S
files a bill to remove a cloud from his title to Blackacre created
by levy of execution and sale. He makes defendant D, who was the
levying creditor and purchaser at the execution sale, and who
appears from the records to be still the owner of the interest, if
any, resulting from that process. S gets a decree against D. Then he
finds that, before the suit was commenced, D had executed a deed
to E which was not recorded at the time S examined the record
and brought suit. Under the common law, the decree is of no
effect as against E. Do the recording acts make it effective? S's
equities are, of course, strong. His change of position is much more
seriOl!-S than that of a creditor who has merely levied an execution,
though hardly equal to that of a purchaser. But we must look at the
letter of the statutes. Here we find a radical difference between our
two main types of legislation. The backhanded statutes never
name suitors among those persons against whom the unrecorded
conveyance is valid, and hence they cover these cases, or at least
some of them-it will be understood that the cases are of many
kinds and some nice questions arise. In fact the decisions have
been quite as generous to suitors as one could hope. On the other
hand, the statutes which name the persons who are to be protected
can .not aid suitors unless they are specifically mentioned,
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which they seldom are, or the courts give a strained interpretation
to the words "purchaser" and "creditor," which they have seldom
done. But, in this connection, attention should be given to the
statutes concerning lis pendens, for in many states this chapter
of the laws has been put in such shape as to reach the case in
hand. If there is nothing but a "purchaser" statute to work with,
might not estoppel help out the suitor who examined the record
and made parties to his suit all whom he found to have an interest
in the equity of redemption, then went on to judgment, and
finally on the day of sale learned of the unrecorded deed and so
could not become a bona fide purchaser? 59
CHATIEL

R.EcoRDING AcTs

We turn now to chattel recording (or filing) acts. Very seldom
do statutes provide for record of an absolute transfer, upon sale
or gift, or of transfer in bailment or pledge. There are exceptions
for particular types of chattel, e.g. registration of ships, and the
now common system of certification of title to automobiles, but
general provisions for miscellaneous chattel property are very
rare. We began, however, more than a century ago, to require
record or filing of chattel mortgages. It was natural enough to
single out the mortgage, for this was the one type of chattel
transaction in which a paper conveyance was an almost invariable
feature. Today, chattel mortgage recording acts will doubtless be
found in every state. In some states the recording system has been
extended to other and newer forms of chattel security, such as
the conditional sale and the trust receipt, but there has been
little tendency to extend it to other than security transactions.
Here, then, we see a marked difference between land and
chattels in the type of conveyance which is subjected to the recording system. Further divergence appears when we consider the
persons who can take advantage of nonrecord, because "notice"
has a different meaning in the two cases (e.g. as to lis pendens),
and the chattel statutes almost (if not quite) always protect
creditors as well as purchasers. Again, it seems to be commoner

59 Cf. Marling v. Nommensen, 127 Wis. 363, 106 N.W. 844 (1906); and on the whole
subject, see Durfee and Fleming, "Res Judicata and Recording Acts," 28 MICH L. REv.
811 (1930).
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here than in the case of land to protect those who gave credit
to the debtor prior to the· recording, without regard to the time
when they fixed a lien on the property. This difference is natural
enough, in view of the limited scope of the chattel acts, which
makes them look less like a conveyancing system, and in view
of their background in the law of fraud. Finally, is not the practical effect of the chattel recording acts very different from that
of the land recording acts? The former clearly give added protection to purchasers, and to creditors if they are in anywise affected
by the legislation. As compared with the common law, the change
is wholly in that direction. With the chattel acts, is not the effect
precisely opposite? Do not these statutes impair the position
of purchasers and creditors by permitting substitution of a formal
record for the more notorious transfer of possession which was
required by the common law? A sweeping answer to this question
is inadvisable. Distinctions should be drawn-for example, between large transactions which will support the cost of examination of the record, and small transactions which will not. Furthermore, the precedent law of fraud should be closely scanned. Generally, it will be found that the recording system has one distinct
advantage, from the point of view of creditor and purchaser,
viz. that statute makes the unrecorded mortgage void, unless possession is delivered to the mortgagee, whereas the law of fraud
more often than not makes retention of possession mere evidence
of fraud or raises a presumption of fraud which can be rebutted,
and this is particularly true in the case of mortgage in contrast
to sale.
BONA FIDE PURCHASE BY THE SECOND HAND

We have looked at a great variety of bona fide purchase problems, yet all the cases which we have discussed have the same
outline. All can be described in these terms: 0 was owner of,
or had some interest in, land or goods or chose in action; V,
villain and vendor purported to sell the thing to P an innocent
purchaser, or purported to charge the thing by mortgage or
pledge or other security transaction in favor of P, or purported
to create in P some other interest, less than absolute ownership;
all under such conditions that, so far as concerns the relations
between O and V, V had no power to make the transfer to P.
In these cases, P never dealt with O in the purchase transaction.
P was always what lawyers used to call "the third hand." May we
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not have cases which are parallel in everything that goes to the
"equities" of the parties, to the justice and policy of the case,
yet do not involve the third hand feature? Suppose, for example,
that V by fraud induces O to make a conveyance of land to P,
who has no notice of the fraud and gives value, perhaps paying
money to V as the consideration agreed to by O: is not P in at
least as good a position to claim protection as he would have been
if O had conveyed to V, under the same inducement, and V had
then sold to P! Of course, he is, and the decisions will support
him, though they may be reasoned, not in terms of bona fide
purchase but in terms of the immateriality of third party fraud.
Chattel cases have gone the same way. 60 Duress by third persons
has generally been dealt with in the same way as fraud of third
persons. The common case is that of conveyance to satisfy or secure
the liability of some member of the transferor's family for misappropriation of funds, the pressure being applied by the obligor,
not by the creditor. In this situation, the transferor is sometimes
let out under rules of illegality (compounding crime) or rules as
to capacity of married women, etc. Perhaps these decisions have
also been influenced by suspicion that the transferee knew of the
duress, even though that was not proved. 61 If there is any difference in the land and chattel cases between bona fide purchase
by the third hand and bona fide purchase by the second hand,
it seems to favor the latter. Note, for example, that in the duress
cases referred to above the value was antecedent debt.
The story becomes more interesting when we turn to choses
in action. If V by fraud procures a promise by O to pay money,
not in the form of a negotiable instrument, and then assigns the
obligation to P, we have seen that bona fides and value will not
enable P to get away from the dirt on V's shoes. But suppose V
by fraud induces O to make a promise to P, for which P gives
value without notice of the fraud-the commonest case is that of
V inducing O to become his surety to P, who gives value to V.
Can the fraud be set up as a defense to an action by P against O'!
Answer, no. 62 This can be fitted into the historical analysis which

60 See 14 AM. & ENG. ENC., 2d ed., 154 (1900).
61 See 4 A.L.R. 864, note (1919); 30 CoL. L. R.Ev. 714 (1930).
62 ARANT, SURETYSHIP 80 (1931); 29 MrcH. L. R.Ev. 945; and see duress cases in 4
A.L.R. 864, note (1919).
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we developed for the third hand case, where P formerly coulq.
not get a legal title to the obligation. In the second hand case, P
would always have been regarded as legal owner of the obligation created by O's promise to him. If you are not satisfied with
this historical reconciliation of the two lines of decision, and
feel that they are in principle inconsistent, which of the two
do you think is right?
With these results in cases of land, goods, and non-negotiable
choses in action, one might think he could reason a fortiori to the
case of negotiable instruments, and so he could under the common
law. But some courts, thinking that certain sections of N .LL
mean that a payee of a negotiable instrument can not be a holder
in due course, and at the same time overlooking the common law
applicable to the case of the innocent payee of the non-negotiable
obligation, have put the payee of the negotiable instrument into
the worse position, mirabile dictu. 63
Surely, you will say, one who receives money, either for present or antecedent value, without notice of false inducements
arising from dealings between the payor and third persons, is in
the clear. Yet, the payee of money is in the most difficult position of
all. Perhaps it could be said that he usually succeeds, but his case
is far from cock-simple. For these aberrations, various reasons can
be found, in various cases, but there is one factor which is fairly
common: payee's counsel does not recognize the bona fide purchase aspect of the case, or does not get it before the court effectively. Even if counsel fully understands the problem, he is in an
awkward forensic position. The difficulty is that such cases obviously fit the label "money paid under mistake" and slide easily
into that thought groove, while they do not at all fit the label
"bona fide purchase," except to one who has become well acquainted with the artificiality of these terms, and so it requires
very considerable professional skill to get these cases into the
judge's bona fide purchase thought groove.
MORAL

We should not close this study of bona fide purchase without
pointing the moral. Can we not assign definite reasons why our

63 See Aigler, "Payees as Holders in Due Course," 36 YALE L.
5th ed., 487 (1932).
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law has failed to give coherent answers to the questions of policy
which are presented by these cases? It seems to the editor to be
chiefly due to the fact that, in the period when this branch of
the law was taking shape, the 18th and 19th centuries, lawyers
and judges did not consider it their business to adopt the legislative
attitude and shape the law on bases of policy. Policy had, we may
assume, a great deal of influence on the decisions, but the influence
was subconscious. Ideas of policy were not definitely organized
nor fertilized by discussion. The reasons for decision which were
thought worthy of argument were "legal reasons." That was, of
course, a handicap. And it brought with it another disturbing
factor. The unity of the subject was lost sight of, and various
forms of the problem were approached from various angles as
mere incidents of distinct departments of the law. With that,
worked the inevitable tendency to insulate each department of
legal doctrine, so that interpenetration of ideas was almost precluded. Such a comparative study of the materials as we have
here indulged in was unknown. FinaIIy, we see the dictatorship of
labels. Words are not only instruments of expression but also
instruments of thought, and some psychologists assert that it is
impossible for homo sapiens to rise to the level of wordless thinking. Whatever be the truth on that point, it is clear that certain
features of the lawyer's business (e.g. the fact that he is concerned
with rules of conduct which must be published, at least to the
profession, if they are to be in any wise effective) make it next
to impossible for him to think without words. And we lawyers
have not fuIIy recognized the significance of words, with the
result that they have had a glorious opportunity to become, not
our servants but our masters.
A prize is offered for the best substitute for "bona fide purchase." But one of the rules of the contest is that the new term
must consist of a word or words of common speech, fairly descriptive of the fact situations with which the law of bona fide purchase deals, because it is difficult to get lawyers to adopt any other
sort of term. Even then, it will not be easy to seII the new term
to the profession, for it is a true saying that it is easier to change
the law than to change legal terminology.
WHAT HAS BECOME OF LITTLE NEMO?

Early in our discussion we propounded the maxim Qui Prior
Est Tempore, etc., and the maxim Nemo Plus Juris, etc., as ex-
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pressing in different ways the primary canon of priority. Yet we
have spent most of our time on sundry rules which defeat that
canon. If you turn, now, to real legal literature, judicial opinions
and text-books on property, contract, etc., you will find that the
primary canon gets much less attention than we give it, and the
opposing rules much more attention, being pursued into details
which we have cheerfully ignored.
Do you, then, conclude that the primary canon is not really
primary? Is this another case of a general rule eaten up by exceptions, in the sense that the exceptions govern more cases than
the general rule? No one has made a statistical study of that
question, but you may profitably reflect upon it.

